Early retirement by CONDE-RUIZ, Jose Ignacio & GALASSO, Vincenzo
Economies Department
Early Retirement
Jose Ignacio  C onde-Ruiz 
and

























































































































































































EU RO PEAN  U N IV E R SITY IN STITU TE, F L O R E N C E  
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
EUI Working Paper E C O  No. 2000/24  
Early Retirement
JOSE IGNACIO C O N D E-R U IZ  
and
V i n c e n z o  G a l a s s o




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the authors.
©  2000 J. I. Conde-Ruiz and V . Galasso 
Printed in Italy in December 2000  
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
































































































Jose Ignacio Conde-Ruiz 
European University Institute
Vincenzo Galasso
IG IER , Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and C E P R
*We thank Marco Celentani for his help and support throughout the entire project. 
We are also grateful for useful comments to Michele Boldrin, Francesco Giavazzi, 
Sergi Jimenez-Martin, David K. Levine, Franco Peracchi, Kjetil Storesletten, Guido 
Tabellini, workshop’s participants at IGIER- Università Bocconi, at the CEPR- 
CEMFI workshop, at PET 2000 and at the 2000 meetings of the Society of Economic 
Dynamics. All remaining errors are ours. Most of this work was written while J. Ig­
nacio Conde-Ruiz was at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Vincenzo Galasso 
acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education DGICYT 




























































































A b strac t
Generous early retirement provisions account for a large propor­
tion of the drop in the labor force participation of elderly workers. The 
aim of this paper is to provide a political-economic explanation of the 
wide spread adoption of generous early retirement. W e suggest that the 
political support for generous early retirement provisions relies on: (i) 
the existence of an initial, significant group of redundant elderly work­
ers with incomplete working history, who are not entitled to an old age 
pension; and (ii) the policy persistence that this provision introduces by 
inducing low-ability workers to retire early. The majority which supports 
early retirement in a bidimensional voting game is composed of elderly 
with incomplete working history and low-ability workers; social security 
is supported by retirees and low-ability workers. A  descriptive analysis 
of eleven OECD countries shows that early retirement provisions were 
adopted during the deindustrialization process, almost always, immedi­
ately after the first severe decrease in industrial employment.
K eyw ord s: Social Security, Policy Persistence, Subgame Perfect 
Structure Induced Equilibrium.




























































































Generous early retirement provisions are largely responsible for the dra­
matic drop in the labor force participation among middle age and elderly 
workers of the last thirty years (see Gruber and Wise (1999) and Blondal 
and Scarpetta (1998)). The generosity1 of these provisions has induced 
workers, in particular, low-educated ones, to retire early, thereby increas­
ing the dependency ratio, and thus creating more financial distress to the 
social security system.
The aim of this paper is to provide a politico-economic explanation 
of the adoption of generous early retirement. W hy did a majority of 
voters, in most industrialized countries, decide to award large pensions 
to middle aged workers with incomplete working history?
W e suggest that the political support in favor of early retirement 
hinges on two crucial conditions. First, the appearance of a large group 
of redundant elderly workers with incomplete working history, who are 
not entitled to an old-age pension. The introduction of early retirement 
awards them a pension transfer. Second, the existence in the early retire­
ment provision of an element of policy persistence. In fact, by inducing 
low-ability workers to retire early, this provision creates its own future 
constituency, since it gives rise to an endogenous group of workers with 
incomplete working history.
The main contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that un­
der these two conditions, a social security system with early retirement 
arises, and is sustained, as a politico-economic equilibrium outcome of a 
dynamic majoritarian voting game. The voting majority which supports 
early retirement is composed of elderly with incomplete working history 
and low-ability young, who expect to retire early. The size of the social 
security system is determined by a voting majority of all retirees and low
•Gruber and Wise (1999) identify two features of this provision, which display a 
strong correlation with the departure of elderly workers from the labor force: the 
early (and normal) retirement age, and the tax burden which is imposed on the labor 
income of the workers, after the early retirement age has been reached. Blondal and 



























































































ability young. Although several studies have analyzed the economic de­
terminants of the early retirement decisions (see among others, Feldstein 
(1974), Boskin y Hurd (1978), Diamond y Mirrless (1978), Lazear (1979), 
Crawford y Lilien (1981)), to our knowledge this is the first attempt to 
provide a theoretical explanation of the introduction of (generous) early 
retirement provisions2.
Our theoretical findings relate quite closely to the labor market sit­
uation at the time of the introduction of these provisions. The adoption 
of early retirement came during the process of deindustrialization, at its 
early stages in many European countries, and only after the oil shocks in 
the US and Canada. In particular, as discussed in section 2, all countries 
in Gruber and W ise’s (1999) sample, with the exception of France, Japan, 
and Spain, introduced a generous provision3 immediately after the first 
large reduction in industrial employment. This is in line with our view 
that the appearance of a large number of redundant elderly workers was 
crucial to gather the initial political support in favor of early retirement.
We introduce a dynamically efficient overlapping generations econ­
omy with storage technology. Young individuals, who are heterogeneous 
in their working ability, decide when to retire. Their labor income is 
endogenously determined by their retirement decision and by their ini­
tial ability. Old age retirement is mandatory. The social security system 
consists of a PAYG scheme. Young workers contribute a fixed propor­
tion of their labor income to the system, and the proceedings are divided 
lump sum among the retirees. There exists an early retirement provi­
sion. Workers who exit the labor market at an early stage, i.e., with
2Gruber and Wise (1999) put forward two possible explanations. They suggest 
that, in some instances, early retirements were introduced to induce elderly workers to 
exit the labor force, and thus to create employment for young workers. Alternatively, 
these provisions were adopted to accommodate a pre-existing decrease in the labor 
force participation, and thus to provide a soft lending for the mass of elderly workers 
who were already out of the labor force, or unable to find a job.
3Actuarially fair early retirements had previously been introduced in Belgium 
(1957) and in the US (1961). We abstract from these provisions, which fail to pro­
vide strong incentives to retire early, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the 




























































































an incomplete working history, are awarded an early retirement pension. 
Individuals who retire at mandatory age receive the full pension.
The social security system is determined in a bidimensional majori- 
tarian voting game played by young and old agents. Voters cast a ballot 
over the payroll tax rate, which finances the social security system, and 
over the existence of an early retirement provision, which entitles agents 
with incomplete working history to a full pension. This political game 
displays two important features. First, because of the bidimensionality of 
the issue space, a Nash equilibrium of this majoritarian voting game may 
not exist. And second, in absence of a commitment device which restricts 
future policies, a social security system may not be politically sustain­
able. In fact, young workers may refuse to transfer resources to current 
retirees, as they have no guarantee to be rewarded with a corresponding 
pension in their old age.
To overcome the former problem, we initially analyze the voting 
game in a static setting, in which current voters can commit to future 
policies. As Shepsle (1979), we introduce a set of institutional restric­
tions which reduces the game to an issue-by-issue voting game, and thus 
concentrate on structure induced equilibria. To deal with the latter fea­
ture, we then replace commitment with the idea of an implicit contract4 
among successive generations. W e look for structure induced equilib­
rium outcomes of the voting game with commitment which can be sus­
tained as subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the game without 
commitment. To summarize, we introduce a notion of stationary sub­
game perfect structure induced equilibrium which combines the concept 
of structure induced equilibrium, introduced by Shepsle (1979), with the 
intergenerational implicit contract idea, originally presented by Ham­
mond (1975).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 analyzes the industrial 
employment at the time of the adoption of early retirement. Section 3 
presents the economic model and the social security system, while section 
4 introduces the voting game, the political institutions, and our notion of
4See Hammond (1975), and more recently Cooley and Soares (1999), Galasso 




























































































equilibrium. Section 5 characterizes the politico-economic equilibria, and 
section 6 concludes. All formal definitions of the institutional restrictions, 
and all proofs axe in the appendix.
2 Timing of Adoption of Early Retirement 
Provisions
Generous early retirement pensions were initially awarded in Europe in 
the 60s, and at the beginning of the 70s, often as disability pensions 
to those elderly workers who had been adversely affected by the labor 
market conditions (as in the Netherlands (1967), in Germany (1969), in 
Sweden (1970) and in the UK (1972)). A  second round of adoptions, 
or modifications of the existing programs, took place after the 1974 oil 
shock. Table 1 reports the dates of adoption of the early retirement 
provisions, and their main characteristics, in all countries in Gruber and 
W ise’s (1999) sample.
Since the mid60s, most industrialized countries have undergone a 
deep deindustrialization process, which has provoked large sectoral shifts 
in employment out of the industry and into services (see figures 1 to 3). 
Most of the job destruction has typically been born by unexperienced 
young and low-educated elderly workers5, to an extent that has largely 
depended on the institutional features of the labor market. Did this dein­
dustrialization process lead to the build-up of a large mass of redundant 
elderly workers? To provide an answer to this question, we examine the 
total employment in industry (and services) in the countries included in 
Gruber and W ise’s sample6 for the years which immediately preceded the 
adoption of early retirement. A  comparison of the timing of adoption of 
early retirement and of the contemporaneous behavior of the industrial
5For example, Bartel and Sicherman (1993) show that an unexpected positive 
technological shock, which affects the skills required to perform a certain task, leads 
to early exit from the labor market of elderly workers.
6We use OECD data on total industrial employment in Belgium, Canada, FYance, 





























































































employment7 (see figures 1 to 3, and table 1) indicates that in all coun­
tries, but Prance, Japan, and Spain8, the introduction of generous early 
retirements provisions has followed the first significant drop in industrial 
employment since 1960.
Figure 1 shows the industrial employment dynamics in Fiance, Ger­
many, Italy and Sweden. In Germany and Italy, the introduction of early 
retirement took place in 1969, after a severe two-years long slump in in­
dustrial employment, which started respectively in the third quarter of 
1966 and in forth quarter of 1964. Sweden adopted the provision in 1970, 
following a decline in industrial employment, from 1966 to 1968 by 3.1%  
annual. Figure 2 displays the industrial employment in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and the UK. The Netherlands were among the first to in­
stitute the provision (through the Disability Act) in 1967, after a slight 
decrease in employment in 1966, and a contemporaneous large reduction 
in 1967. In the UK, the adoption of early retirement came in 1972, dur­
ing the steady decline in industrial employment, which had started in 
1966. Belgium introduced a form of early retirement, which required the 
substitution of an elderly workers with a young unemployed, in 1976, a 
year after the begin of the decreasing trend in industrial employment. 
Finally, figure 3 shows the employment scenario in Japan, Spain, the US, 
and Canada. In the US, the “recalculation effect,” which discouraged 
early retirement, was substantially reduced (see Ippolito (1990)) in 1977. 
These changes came after the 1974 oil shock, which led to a two year 
long recession9. Finally, Canada adopted an early retirement provision 
only in 1984 (Quebec) and in 1987 (the rest of Canada), following the
7Ideally, one would like to analyze the employment by sex, age, education and 
sector, to identify the labor market situation of those agents, who are more likely to 
benefit from early retirement, typically low educated, elderly male in manufacturing. 
Unfortunately, these data are not available for the period under consideration.
8Why were these three countries different? In France, generous early retirement 
provisions were introduced already in 1963, after a large drop in employment in mining 
and in the iron industry, two highly unionized sectors. Japan (1973) has always 
enjoyed one of the least generous provision (see Gruber and Wise (1999)); while 
Spain adopted a generous provision in 1976, during its transition to democracy.
9For an analysis of the effects of the 1974 oil shock on job reallocation in the US 




























































































1982-83 spectacular drop in industrial employment.
3 The Economic Environment
We consider a two period overlapping generations model with storage 
technology. Every period two generations are alive: Young and Old. 
Population grows at a constant rate, n >  0. Young agents determine the 
length of their working period. Old age retirement is mandatory, and 
thus old agents do not work. All consumption takes place in old age, and 
agents only value young age leisure and old age consumption.
Agents are assumed to be heterogeneous in their working ability. 
Abilities are distributed on the interval [x,x] C 5R+, according to a cu­
mulative distribution function F (.), which is assumed to have mean px, 
and to be skewed, F (px) >  1 /2 .
Young agents decide when to exit the labor market. They may 
decide to work during the entire working period, i.e., until they reach 
mandatory retirement age, or they may retire early. Pension transfers, 
to be paid for the remaining period of their live, are awarded to all agents 
who have worked at least until minimum retirement age, ©  <  1. However, 
the amount of the pension transfer an agent receives may differ according 
to the length of her actual working period. Let pt be the pension awarded 
at time t to an old agent who retired at mandatory age (we will refer to 
pt as the full pension). And let n + i  be the percentage of the full pension 
transfer awarded at time t +  1 to an old agent born at time t, then
r{+i (</>t) = r{ =
0 if <j>t <  ©
Q if ©  <  (pt <  1
1 if <{>t =  1
(1)
where subscripts indicate the calendar time and superscripts the period 
in which the agent was born, <t>t €  [0, 1] represents the proportion of the 
working period she spent working, ©  is the minimum length of the work­
ing period, or, analogously, the minimum retirement age to be eligible 




























































































paid to an agent who retires early. In words, agents who work less than 
a proportion 0  of their working period receive no pensions; agents who 
retire early obtain a share a of the full pension during the remaining 
of their youth and in their old age (respectively (1 — <f>t) ctPt and apt+i) 
whereas agents retiring at the mandatory retirement age receive the full 
pension in their old age.
A  production function coverts the duration of the working period, 
4i, into the only consumption good, according to the worker’s ability, x:
y{<p,x)=<px (2)
A  storage technology transforms a unit of today’s consumption into 
1 +  r units of tomorrow’s consumption: yt+i =  (1 + r )y t. All private 
intertemporal transfers of resources into the future are assumed to take 
place through this technology. Additionally, we assume that r >  n, and 
thus that the economy is dynamically efficient.
Young agents have to decide the length of their working period, 4>, 
that is, whether they will retire early or at mandatory age. They pay a 
proportional tax on their labor income, and save all their resources for 
old age consumption through the storage technology. Old agents take no 
relevant economic decision; they simply consume all their wealth. The 
intertemporal budget constraint of a type x agent born at time t is thus:
c\+i = (fax (i -  n) +  (i -  fa) r{ {fa) pt) { i  + r) +  r‘+1 (4>t)pt+1 (3)
where Tt is the payroll tax rate which finances the pensions at time t, 
and pt and pt+i are respectively the full pension at time t and t +  1.
Agents value leisure in their working period and old age consump­
tion, according to a separable utility function: U ( 0 t,c{+1) =  l {4>t) +  
/3u (c|+1) ,  where /3 is the individual time discount factor. We interpret 
the utility that an agent attaches to leisure as the utility associated to 
the free time which becomes available after an early exit from the la­
bor market, i.e., after early retirement. If an agent decides to work, in 




























































































mandatory age10, due to the relation between the length of the work­
ing period and the associated proportion of the full pension (see eq. 1). 
Thus, leisure, 1 — 0, will only take two values: 0 and 1 — 0 ,  and we can 
normalize the corresponding utilities to: 1(1) = 0  and l ( 0 )  =  v. Ad­
ditionally, to make sure that every agent has an incentive to work, and 
that no agent will retire early in absence of an early retirement provision, 
we assume that l(<j>) =  v < x (1 — 0 ) ,  V0 €  [0, ©].
The utility function is assumed to be linear in consumption: u (c{+i) 
c(+1. This guarantees the young age decision, i.e., the length of working 
period, to be affected by the tax rates (substitution effect), but not by 
the level of the transfers (income effect), which only influences old age 
consumption. This assumption, as discussed in the next section, allows 
us to find an equilibrium of the voting game on the social security tax 
rate, even though preferences may not be single peaked. The assumption 
that consumption only takes place in old age is not innocuous, since it 
disregards a relevant element for social security: the saving decision11. 
Finally, we assume that the individual discount factor is equal to the in­
verse of the real interest factor, (3 =  1 /(1  + r), so that the young decision 
over the length of the working period does not depend on the exogenous 
interest rate.
To summarize, agents decide the length of their working period by 
maximizing U (</>t,c{+1) with respect to 0 t subject to the budget con­
straint at equation 3. The following lemma characterizes this economic 
decision. All proofs are in the technical appendix.
L em m a  1 For a given tax rate rt, and given proportions at, a t+i of
10This retirement behavior, which is induced by the shape of the function F (.), is 
consistent with the evidence reported by Gruber and Wise (1999).
11 In fact, the existence of a PAYG system induces changes in the factor prices of 
labor and capital, thereby affecting the saving decisions of the agents. In particular, 
the introduction of a PAYG social security system, by reducing the capital stock, may 
increase the real interest rate, decrease the wage rate, and thus modify the net wealth 
of the agents. Our model abstracts from these considerations, which are analyzed in 
Cooley and Soares (1998), Galasso (1999), and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000). See 





























































































the full pensions pt and Pt+i, the economic decision of the agents can be 
summarized as follows:
0  i / i  <  i f
1 if x >  i f (4)
where
R ( l - G ) a tPt- ^ p t+1 +  v
( l - r t) ( l - 6 )
(5)
In words, i f  represents the ability level of an agent who is indif­
ferent between retiring early and at the mandatory retirement age, as 
shown at eq. 4. Clearly, those with ability levels below the threshold, 
x <  i f ,  retire early, and the others at mandatory age. The endogenous 
threshold ability, i f ,  and therefore the mass of early retirees, depends 
positively on the agents’ valuation of their leisure, v, on the generosity 
of the early retirement provision, at and a t+1, and of today’s pension pt, 
and on the current tax burden, rt, and negatively on the generosity of 
the future pension’s, pt+1 (see eq. 5). At this point, we can obtain the 
gross labor income for a type i  young agent:
3.1 The Social Security System
We consider a pay as you go (PAYG) social security system, in which 
workers contribute a fixed proportion of their labor income to the system, 
and the proceedings are divided among old age and early retirees. A  
retired person receives a lump sum pension which may depend on the 
length of her working period, but not on her labor income. The system 
is assumed to be balanced every period, so that the sum of all awarded 
pensions has to equal the sum of all received contributions.
Due to the combination of a proportional labor income tax and of 





























































































redistribution, from the rich to the poor. As in Tabellini (1990) and in 
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (1999), this feature is crucial, because it induces 
low ability young to support the social security system12.
The full pension transfer which balances the budget constraint is 
equal to:
Tax Base
(1 +  n) J <j>t (x)xdF(x)
Pt j r [-1 {x)) dF (x) +  (1 +  n) I  ( l - f a  ( z ) ) r j  (fo (x))dF(x)Tt'
Old Age Retirees Early Retirees
(7)
By substituting in eq. 7 the economic decision of the agents at Lemma 
3.1, we obtain
[l -  ( 1 - 0 )L f (f  (**))] (l+n)Mx
Pt 1 — (1 — q () F  (x ? j) +  (1 +  n) (1 — 6 ) atF (xR)Tt { )
where px — J* xdF (x) is the mean ability in the economy, F { x f  is 
the proportion of young who decides to retire early, and Lp {F  (z ^ ))  =  
{ i f  xdF (x)̂ j / fix represents the proportion of total ability owned by the 
early retirees.
Although in this model xR, and thus the mass of early
retirees, is endogenous, at the beginning of our economy, at t =  0, there 
may exist a mass of old people with incomplete working history, who 
have not matured any right to a pension transfer. This represents the 
initial condition of the economy:
D efinition  1 We call e S [0,1] the mass of old individuals with incom­
plete working history in the initial period, t =  0, who had not matured 
any right to a pension transfer. We will refer to this mass, e, as the 
initial condition of the economy.
12 Evidence in favor of the existence of this within cohort redistribution can be found 




























































































To summarize, in every period, the social security system can be 
characterized by a quadruple: the exogenous minimum retirement age, 
the payroll tax rate, the full pension, and the percentage of the full pen­
sion awarded to the early retirees, ( 0 ,r ,p ,a ) .  To simplify the analysis, 
we assume that early retirees are either awarded the full pension or noth­
ing at all, a €  {0 ,1 } . Since a is determined by all electors in the voting 
game, this assumption amounts to restrict the choice over a to whether 
to introduce the institution of a generous early retirement (which would 
pay the full pension) or not. The other dimension of the voting game, 
the payroll tax rate, r , is unrestricted, r  e  [0, 1], and thus agents can 
choose their most preferred size of the system. The next lemma shows 
an important implication of our assumption.
L em m a 2 For a given rt =  r  and for at =  3  Vt, if e ^  F (xq'), the 
sequence of full pensions which balances the social security budget con­
straint in every period is a constant sequence, pt — p Vf, if and only if 
a =  1 .
A  direct consequence of this lemma is that if (and only if) early 
retirees are awarded the full pension, a  =  1, then for any initial condition 
of the economy, e, a stationary social security system (rt =  f  , at = a 
and Pt — P Vt) exists for different values of the stationary tax rate, 
r . Moreover, if a =  1, for any initial condition of the economy, e, the 
endogenous mass of elderly with incomplete working history, F  , 
reaches its steady state value in one period.
The following expression describes the relation between the full 
pension and the tax rate in the case of early retirement:
[l — (1 — e)LF(F (*«))] ( l+n)p
’ 1 +  (1 +  n) (1 — 0 ) F  (xR) (9)
A rise in the tax rate has a direct, positive impact on the pension transfer, 
and an indirect negative effect, since it induces more early retirements, 
and thus increases the dependency ratio. The exact magnitude of these 




























































































the endogenous mass of early retirees, F (xR̂ j, and their relative ability 
level, LF (F  and can be summarized by the elasticity of the full
pension transfer to the tax rate:
d p (r ,l )  t
VP(r,i),r- dr p ( r l ) .
When there is no early retirement provision, i.e., at =  a =  0, if 
the tax rates are constant, rt =  r Vt, and there exists an initial mass 
of elderly people with incomplete working history, i.e., t >  0, then the 
pension sequence will be constant, except in the initial period, when it 
will be larger than its constant value, that is, Po >  Pt — V Vi. In fact, 
at t =  0, due to the existence of a mass of old individuals, who are not 
entitled to a pension, total contributions are divided among fewer old 
than in future periods, when no agents will retire early, since a  =  0, and 
thus every old will receive an old age pension. For a given tax rate, r , 
the constant pension levels are
p (r, 0)
(1 +  n) hxt for f >  0 
(1 +  n) pxr /e  for f =  0 ( 11)
Notice that, in this case, a rise in the tax rate induces an unambiguous 
increase in the pension transfer.
3.2 The Economic Equilibrium
The following definition introduces the economic equilibrium, given the 
values of the social security systems, which will be determined in the 
political game.
D efinition  2 For a given sequence {rt, a t,p t}“ 0, on early retirement 
age, 0 , an exogenous interest rate, r, and the function T (4>) defined in 
eq. 1, an economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations, {{(ft (x) >




























































































i. In every period agents solve the consumer problem, i.e. every young 
individual maximizes her utility function U (fit, ct+i) with respect 
to fit, and subject to eq. 3;
ii. The social security budget constraint is balanced every period, i.e. 
eq. 7 holds;
iii. The good market clears in every period: for every t
j c{-1 (x) dF (x) =  (1 +  r) J (1 -  rt_i) fit- 1 (x) xdF (x) +
(1 +  r) Pt—i j  { l -  fit-1  (z)) {fit-i (z)) dF (x) +
(1 +  n) pt J Tj-1 {fit-i (x)) dF (x)
The utility obtained in an economic equilibrium by a type x young 
agent and by a type x old agent is represented respectively by the fol­
lowing indirect utility functions:
v\ {Tt,ott, rt+i, a t+i, x) =  max (x) . ^ ^ ( x ) }  (12)
v°{Tt,at,x) = Kt {x){ l+r) +  Tt {fit-i {x))pt (13)
where
v t ' R ( rt> Qt> rt+i> Qt+ i ,z )  =  (1 - T t) x  +  j ^ ~  (14)
1 4- r
and
vYR (rt,Q t,r t+i ,a t+i ,x )  =  v +  9  (1 -  rt) x +  (1 -  6 ) atpt + Qt+iPf+i
1 + r  ' 
(15)
vt'R{Tt,0‘t,‘rt+i ,a t+i ,z )  and v^ R (r£, at, rt+l,at+i,x) represents respec­
tively the utility of a type x young individual when she retires at manda­
tory age and when she retires early, and Kt (x) is a constant which does 
not depend on past or current values of the social security system13.
13Specifically, K t (x) = (1 - r ,_ i ) x
0 ( 1 -  Tt- l )  x  +  (1 -  0 )  Qt_ip (_i
if <pt- i (x) =  1 




























































































4 The Voting Game
The size and the composition of the social security system Eire determined 
through a political process which aggregates agents’ preferences over the 
payroll tax rate, r  €  [0, 1], and over the existence of early retirement, a  £  
{0 ,1 } . W e consider a political system of majoritarian voting. Elections 
take place every period. All persons alive, young and old, cast a ballot 
over r  and a. However, since every agent has zero mass, no individual 
vote could affect the outcome of the election. To overcome this problem, 
we assume sincere voting.
Two features of this majoritarian voting game are worth noticing. 
First, because of the bidimensionality of the issue space, (r, a ), a Nash 
equilibrium of this majoritarian voting game may not exist. Second, if 
no commitment device is available to restrict future policies, why would 
young people agree to transfer resources to current retirees, given that 
there is no guarantee that this young-to-old transfer policy will be kept 
in the future? To deal with these two features of the game, we introduce 
a notion of equilibrium which combines the concept of structure induced 
equilibrium, due to Shepsle (1979), with the idea of intergenerational 
implicit contract, introduced by Hammond (1975).
To analyze the possible lack of Nash equilibria induced by the bidi­
mensionality of the issue space, we first consider the case of full com­
mitment. Voters choose a constant sequence of the parameters of the 
social security system (r, a ). Thus, the voting game becomes a bidi- 
mensional game in which r  and a  are determined once and for all. It 
is well known in the political science literature14 that multidimensional­
ity of the issue space generates Condorcet cycles, unless very restrictive 
assumptions over the distribution of the agents’ preferences apply, and 
a median in all directions exists15. Following Shepsle (1979), we choose 
to introduce some institutional restrictions to the voting game and thus
14See, for example, Ordershook (1986).
15See Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (1999) for a graphic interpretation of the Condorcet 





























































































to concentrate on structure induced equilibria. These institutional re­
strictions, which are presented in section 4.1, effectively transform the 
bidimensional election into an issue by issue voting game, in which a 
(structure induced) equilibrium always exists.
If the assumption of commitment is dropped, would the young still 
be willing to vote for a positive social security level? If young agents 
expect their current vote not to have any impact on future policies, they 
will vote for a zero social security tax rate, or they will incur in a net cost. 
However, young agents may believe that their current voting decision will 
influence future voters. In this case, as initially suggested by Hammond 
(1975), an implicit contract may arise among successive generations of 
voters, and young workers may agree to vote a pension to the current 
old as they expect to be rewarded in their old age by a corresponding 
pension.
In section 4.2, the assumption of commitment of future policies is 
replaced by the use of an implicit contract among successive generations 
of voters. W e define the voting game and the stationary strategy pro­
files, which may support structure induced equilibrium outcomes of the 
voting game with commitment as subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes 
of the voting game without commitment. Like Cooley and Soares (1999) 
and Galasso (1999), we concentrate on stationary strategy profiles. This 
is because we want to generalize the structure induced equilibrium out­
come obtained in a static environment (the game with commitment at 
steady state) to a dynamic environment, the game without commitment. 
Clearly, non stationary profiles, as in Azariadis and Galasso (1997) and 
Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), would give rise to additional equilibrium 
outcomes, which, however, would not be structure induced equilibrium 
outcomes of the static game with commitment. W e call our notion of 





























































































4.1 Structure Induced Equilibria
In this section, we consider a majoritarian voting game with commitment 
at steady state. Voters determine the constant sequence of the payroll 
tax rate, r  6 [0, 1], and the existence of an early retirement provision, 
which would pay the full pension, a e  {0 ,1 } .  At steady state, the initial 
mass of old individuals with incomplete working history, e, is equal to 
its endogenous steady state value, F . Therefore, the sequence of 
pensions, p, is constant, and the game of commitment, at steady state, 
collapses to a static bidimensional voting game over r  and a. Individual 
preferences over the two issues are represented by the indirect utility 
functions at equations 12 and 13. All individuals are assumed to vote 
sincerely.
To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium of this voting game, 
we follow Shepsle (1979) in defining a set of institutional restrictions, 
which determine how the political system aggregates individual prefer­
ences over the alternatives into a political outcome. An institution is 
composed of a committee structure, a jurisdictional system, an assign­
ment rule, and an amendment control rule16. In Shepsle (1979), this 
political arrangement is intended to capture the policy making process 
in a representative democracy. By applying these institutional restric­
tions to our voting game, we implicitly assume that the representatives’ 
preferences perfectly reflect the voters’ ones.
The institutional restrictions we adopt consist of: (i) a Commit­
tee of the Whole, i.e., there exists only one committee, which coincides 
with the entire electorate; (ii) Simple Jurisdictions, i.e., every jurisdic­
tion represents one dimension (or issue) in the space of alternatives; (iii) 
an Assignment Rule, which assigns every simple jurisdiction to the com­
mittee of the whole; and (iv) a Germaneness Amendment Control Rule, 
which establishes that only amendments to proposals which belong to 
the jurisdiction of the committee are accepted17.
16See the Appendix for the formal definitions.
17In other words, if the committee is using its jurisdiction to deliberate a proposal 




























































































Therefore, in our political system, every jurisdiction is assigned to 
the entire electorate, i.e., the entire electorate is allowed to make proposal 
to modify any of the two dimension in the issue space ( t , a ); however, 
only separately, i.e., issue by issue. Simple jurisdictions and germaneness 
guarantee that alternatives are on the floor only issue by issue. This 
implication of our legislative restrictions is crucial to eliminate possible 
Condorcet cycles and to obtain a (structure induced) equilibrium.
As Shepsle (1979) [Theorem 3.1] showed, a sufficient condition for 
(r*, q *) to be an equilibrium of the voting game induced by the legislative 
structure explained above is that r* represents the outcome of a majority 
voting over the jurisdiction r , when the other dimension is fixed at its 
level a*, and viceversa. This theorem suggests that the equilibrium out­
come can be found by calculating the median voter in both dimensions. 
In our voting game with commitment, however, individual preferences 
over constant tax rates, for a given a, need not be single peaked, and 
thus the median voter theorem may not apply. The following example 
will illustrate this point. Let a =  1, i.e., early retirees receive full pen­
sion benefits, and consider a young individual who does not plan to retire 
early, and opposes a small increase in the tax rate. The same agent could 
nevertheless agree to a larger increase in r , which would induce her to 
retire early and therefore to pay the income tax for a smaller period of 
time, and to receive pension for a longer period.
Despite this problem, however, our economic environment induces 
an ordering of individual preferences over the tax rate, r , for a given 
a & { 0, 1} which is consistent with the use of the median voter (see 
Lemma A .7 in the appendix). In fact,
L em m a 3 The Nash equilibrium outcome of the static majoritarian vot­
ing game with commitment over r, for a given a, is the tax rate preferred 
by a young individual of ability type xmT =  F _1 ( ^l+n)) •
The intuition is that individual preferences display hierarchical ad­
herence, as defined by Roberts (1977). Young voters can be ordered 




























































































higher tax rate than the young. Therefore, the median voter theorem 
applies. An analogous lemma applies to the voting game over a:
L em m a 4 The Nash equilibrium outcome of the static majoritarian vot­
ing game with commitment over a, for a given t, is the tax rate preferred 
by a young individual of ability type Xma =  F _1 (~—̂ rrr r̂~
In this case, the early retirement provision is preferred by old with 
incomplete working history and low-ability young. The order of prefer­
ences over the two issues is described in figure 4, and it will be discussed 
in details in section 4.1.
4.2 Subgame Perfection and Stationary Subgame 
Perfect Structure Induced Equilibria
In this section, the assumption of commitment is dropped, and we con­
sider stationary voting strategies which may induce an implicit contract 
among successive generations of voters. We define the voting game, and 
then formalize our concept of equilibrium: the stationary subgame per­
fect structure induced equilibrium.
The public history of the game at time t, ht =  { ( to, o:o) ,  ••• , 
(rt_ i, O t-i)} 6 Ht, is the sequence of social security tax rates and early 
retirement parameters until t — 1, where Ht is the set of all possible 
history at time t. An action for a type x young individual at time 
t is a pair of social security tax rate and early retirement parameter, 
a\,x =  (r, a) 6 [0,1] x { 0 ,1 } .  Analogously, an action for a type x old 
individual at time t is a°x =  (r, a) €  [0,1] x {0 ,1 } .  Thus, at time t every 
voter chooses a pair (r, a). W e identify with at the action profile of all 
individuals (young and old) at time t: at =  {a\ U a°) where a\ — U _  a\x
xG[z,x] ’
and a° — u _  a°x.
x€[x,x j '
A strategy for a type x young individual at time t is a mapping from 
the history of the game into the action space: s\̂  : ht —» [0, 1] x { 0, 1}. 




























































































ht —> [0,1] x  {0 ,1 } .  We denote with st the strategy profile played by 
all individuals at time t, i.e., st =  (sj'Us®) where s? =  U _  s\x and
xe [x,x] ’
s°t =  U s°tx.
For a given action profile at time t, at, let (rtm, a™) be respectively 
the median of the distribution of tax rates, and the median of the distri­
bution of the early retirement parameters. W e call (r£m, a [") the outcome 
function of the voting game at time t. Notice that this outcome function 
corresponds to the structure induced equilibrium outcome of the voting 
game with commitment at steady state, described in the previous section.
The history of the game is updated according to the outcome func­
tion; at time f +  1: ht+i =  {(r0,Q0) ,.. . .  (rt_i , a t _ i ) , (r(m, a™ )} e  Ht+l.
For a given sequence of action profiles, (do,..., at, at+1, ...), and their 
corresponding realizations, ((r0, a 0) ,.. . ,  (rt, at) , (rt+1, a f+1) , . . . ) ,  the ex­
pected payoff function for a type x young individual at time t is vf (r, 
,Qt, Tt+i, Qt+i, x}, according to eq. 12, and for a type x old agent is 
v° (rt, at, x ), according to eq. 13.
Let syt =  sy/sy~ be the strategy profile at time t for all the young 
individuals except for the type x young individual, and let s°|~ =  s° / s°x 
be the strategy profile at time t for all the old individuals except for the 
type x old individual. At time t, the type x young individual maximizes 
the following function:
Vh  ( So’ ( sf|ï’ sk )  ’ s°' s*+1> - )  =  w‘y (rtm> rt+i> Q(+i> z)
and a type x old individual, at time t, maximizes the following function
St i St+i, x)
where, according to our previous definition of the outcome function, 
(r(m, q J71) and are, respectively, the median among the ac­
tions over the two parameters of the social security system played at 




























































































As previously discussed, our concept of equilibrium combines sub­
game perfection, and specifically the use of stationary strategies to sup­
port an intergenerational implicit contract, with the notion of structure 
induced equilibrium needed to overcome the bidimensionality problem. 
We thus define a stationary subgame perfect structure induced equilib­
rium of the voting game as follows:
D efinition  3 (S S P S IE ) A voting strategy profile s =  {(sj1 U s°)}“ 0 is 
a Stationary Subgame Perfect Structure Induced Equilibrium (SSPSIE) 
if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) s is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(ii) At every time t, the equilibrium outcome associated to s is a Struc­
ture Induced Equilibrium of the static game with commitment.
(iii) In any period and for any history, ht 6 Ht, the sequence of equilib­
rium outcomes induced by s is constant.
5 Politico-Economic Equilibria
In this section, we apply the notion of stationary subgame perfect struc­
ture induced equilibrium (SSPSIE) to the voting game which determines 
the size and the composition of the social security system, (r, a ). First, 
the structure induced equilibrium (SIE) outcomes of the static voting 
game with commitment are analyzed. We look at the SIE outcomes at 
steady state, and thus, as in Galasso (1999), we impose that the initial 
condition of the economy, e, is equal to the its steady state value, F . 
We, then, relax this assumption, and study the SSPSIE outcomes of the 
game with no commitment. In this dynamic environment, the initial 
condition, e, i.e. the initial mass of old agents with incomplete working 





























































































5.1 The Voting Game with Commitment
The institutional restrictions introduced in section 4.1 reduce the bidi- 
mensional voting game over (r, a ) to an issue by issue election. To obtain 
the equilibrium outcome of this election, we first need to calculate every 
elector’s ideal point over the social security tax rate for every value of the 
early retirement parameter; and then over the early retirement parameter 
for every value of the tax rate. For every a , we identify the median ideal 
r; and for every r, we identify the median ideal a . The points in which 
these two median functions cross represent structure induced equilibrium 
outcomes of the voting game (by Shepsle (1979), Thm 4.1). Notice that, 
since a can only take two values, a  €  { 0, 1} , we only have to calculate 
the median voter’s (over the dimension r) most preferred tax rate with 
and without early retirement, respectively t w r  and r NR, and then to 
evaluate the median voter’s (over a) indirect utility at a =  0 and a — 1 
for the corresponding tax rates, t n r  and t w r .
When voting on the tax rate, old agents always choose a higher tax
rate18 than any young, since they receive a lump sum transfer, and, unlike
the young, they are no longer required to contribute to the system. In
particular, they choose the tax rate that maximizes their pension transfer:
r° (a) eargm ax pt (r, a ). 
re (o ,i)
Among the young, low ability types prefer a higher tax rate than 
high ability ones, because of the within-cohort redistribution component 
of the system. Agents can be ordered over this issue as shown in figure 4 
(top panel), and the median voter over r  will be a young individual with 
ability xmT =  F -1 (n /2  (1 +  n)), as in Lemma 4.1.
If there is no early retirement provision, a =  0, the median voter’s 
optimization problem over r  is linear, since an increase in the tax rate 
entails no distortion. Therefore, the median voter most preferred tax
18Notice that, since we analyze SIE in which the economy starts at steady state, if 
a =  0, then t  =  0, i.e., there are no old agents with incomplete history; whereas if 




























































































rate, tnr, is the following:
f 0 if XmT >  
\ 1 if Xmr ^
(16)
where can be interpreted as the relative performance of the social 
security system with respect to the other available saving technology. In 
words, if the median voter has a low enough ability level (as compared to 
the average ability), she will support the largest feasible system, whereas 
she will oppose any system if her ability level is large enough.
If the early retirement provision exists, a =  1, the median voter 
may either decide to retire early or at mandatory age. If she decides to 
retire early, her most preferred tax rate, twr, is implicitly defined by the 
following expression:
Aw% (Tli),T =  1 (17)
where J7p(r,i),r is the elasticity of the pension to the tax rate, as defined 
in eq. 10, and




represents the ratio of lifetime discounted pension transfers to lifetime 
contributions for the median voter. The median voter determines the 
tax rate by equating the marginal disutility from the income tax to the 
marginal utility from the increase in the pension, where the elasticity 
measures both the direct positive effect, and the indirect negative effects 
of an increase in the tax rate over the pension.
If the median voter decides to work during her entire working pe­









which have an analogous interpretation as equations 17 and 18. Clearly, 




























































































Awr >  1 and A R >  1, i.e., that the net present value from social security 
has to be positive.
Finally, to determine her vote when a =  1, the median voter has 
to compare the utility associated with voting twr and retiring early to 
the utility associated to voting t r  and retiring at mandatory age. For a 
given a , the median voter’s most preferred tax rate can be summarized
as follows:
' twr if a  =  1 and vWR [rWR, l , * mr) > V NR (rR, 1 ^rnTj
T*mr (<*) =  ' rR if a  =  1 and v WR 't w r , 1 , x J < V NR ( r fl, l Zmrj
tnr if R II o
(21)
where, for constant sequences (r, a ), vj (r, a , x) with j  =  NR, WR,  iden­
tifies the indirect utility function rf (rt, a t, r(+i, a t+1, x) at equations 14 
and 15.
W ho is willing to support an early retirement provision? In every 
period, there may exist a mass of old agents with incomplete working 
history, who have not matured any right to an old age pension19. These 
agents clearly support the existence of early retirement, a =  1. On the 
other hand, old individuals with complete working history oppose this 
provision, which would reduce their full (old age) pension. Among the 
young, low ability types would take advantage of the early retirement 
provision, and therefore they will support its institution, whereas high 
ability types will oppose it. Agents can thus be ordered over this issue 
as shown in figure 4 (bottom panel). By Lemma 4.2, the median voter 
over q  will be a young individual with ability:
, (2 +  n - 2 F  (xRY  
= F  2 (1 +  n) ( 22)
19At the beginning of the economy, t =  0, this mass is exogenous, and represents 
the initial condition of the economy, e e [0,1], In the following periods, t = 1,2,..., 
the fraction of young individuals, F (xR), who decide to exit the labor market with an 
incomplete working history is endogenous, and depends on the equilibrium outcome 
of the voting game. In this section, we assume to start off our economy at steady 




























































































To determine the median voter’s ideal a, for a given r , it is useful 
to identify a key threshold for the young ability level. For a given tax 
rate r, let x (r) be the ability level of the young agent who is indifferent 
between voting for a social security system of size r  with early retirement, 
(r, 1), or without it, (r, 0):
x (r) s.t. vWR (r, l , i  (t )) =  vNR (r, 0, x ( r ) ) . (23)
Clearly, agents with x < x (r) will vote for a system with early retirement, 
(r, 1), and viceversa20.
The median voter’s most preferred a , for a given t , can thus be 
summarized as follows:
Qxmo (t )
1 if Xmn < x (r) 
0 if Xma > X (r) (24)
Additionally, for a given tax rate r , let x (r) be the ability level 
of the young agent who is indifferent between a social security of size r  
with early retirement, (r, 1), in which case she would retire early, and no 
social security:
x (t ) s.t. vWR (r, 1 ,5  (r)) =  vNR (0 ,0 , x (r)) =  x (t ) . (25)
Agents with x < x (r) prefer a social security system with early retire­
ment, (r, 1), and viceversa. Finally, let define a threshold for the utility 
from leisure, v*, as follows:
v- =  (1 -  0 ) 1 +  n
1-1V
0  (r — n)
1 +  (1 +  n) (1 — 0 ) '
(26)
The next proposition is an application of Shepsle’s (1979) main 
result to our voting game with commitment at steady state. A  structure
20Notice that the threshold ability which makes an agent indifferent between voting 
a system with or without early retirement is lower than the threshold ability which 
makes an agent indifferent between retiring early or at mandatory age, x  (r) <  x R (r). 
This is because the individual economic choice over the time of retirement does not 
generate any distortion over the social security system whereas the political voting 




























































































induced equilibrium with (or without) early retirement provision exists 
if and only if the reaction functions of the median voters over a and r  
cross at a  =  1 (a  =  0).
P roposition  5 In the voting game with commitment, at steady state:
(i) for xmT € [x, there exists a SIE with outcome (rNR =  l ,o )  if
and only if v < v*, and there exists a SIE with outcome (rWR, l )  if and 
only if xma < x (twr'); (ii) for xmT € ( ^ 7Pi, 2], there always exists 
a SIE with outcome (rNR =  0 ,0 ) , and there exists a SIE with outcome 
(twr, l )  if and only if xma <  x (r>VH) and xmT < x (twrS) ■
When the ability level of the median voter xmT is sufficiently low 
to guarantee her a positive net present value from “investing” in social 
security (with no early retirement), a social security system, with or 
without early retirement provision, arises as a SIE outcome of the voting 
game, provided that the utility from leisure in the case of early exit 
from the labor market is not too large (v < v’ ). For higher ability 
levels, xmT > 7*7 p*, social security may only exist together with the 
early retirement provision. Notice that, for some parameter values, the 
voting game with commitment displays multiple equilibria, and two SIE 
outcomes, (rWR, l )  and (rNR, o ) , may arise.
This proposition suggests that the introduction of early retirement 
hinges on the median voter over a being a low ability type, xma < 
x (twr Ĵ , which in turn requires the mass of elderly with incomplete 
working history to be large in equilibrium. In other words, the institu­
tion of early retirement provision depends crucially on the incentives they 
provide to low-ability workers to retire early, i.e., on their generosity.
Notice that, since we concentrate on SIE outcomes at steady state, 
this proposition is formulated in terms of F  rather than of e. In
fact, we force e to be equal to F (̂ xR'j. The initial condition, e, will, 
however, be crucial in the proposition which analyzes the (stationary 





























































































5.2 The Voting Game without Commitment
We now turn to the analysis of the stationary subgame perfect struc­
ture induced equilibria. The idea is to generalize the results obtained in 
proposition 5.1 for the game with commitment at steady state to a game 
without commitment, in which the initial condition of the economy, e, 
could differ from its steady state, endogenous value, F . Moving 
from a game with commitment to a game in which commitment is re­
placed by the idea of implicit contract does not affect the steady state 
analysis. The initial period, t =  0, need, on the other hand, to be studied. 
In fact, even if the conditions for a SIE with early retirement are satisfied 
at steady state (Prop 4.1), there may not be enough old with incomplete 
working history, e, to support early retirement at t =  0. In this case, 
the equilibrium outcome of the game with commitment would not carry 
over to the game without commitment. The next proposition identifies 
sufficient conditions for SIE of the voting game with commitment to be 
SSPSIE outcomes of the voting game without commitment.
P rop osition  6 (i) Every pair (rWR, l )  which constitutes an outcome of 
a SIE of the static voting game with commitment is a SSPSIE outcome 
of the voting game without commitment, if
e >  min -  (1 +  n)F (x (rWR)) , -  (1 +  n)F (x (rWR)) j
(ii) Every pair (rNR, Oj which constitutes an outcome of a SIE of the 
static voting game with commitment is a SSPSIE outcome of the voting 
game without commitment.
For a SIE outcome of the voting game with commitment to be a 
SSPSIE outcome of the game without commitment, we need to specify a 
voting strategy profile, or implicit contract, which supports this outcome, 
and represents a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game without com­
mitment. A  formal description of an equilibrium strategy profile is in the 
appendix. The proposition above quantifies the initial condition e, which 




























































































be initially introduced. Specifically, at t =  0, there have to be enough 
old agents with incomplete working history, e, to guarantee that the abil­
ity of the initial median voter over a is sufficiently small to induce her 
to prefer a social security system with early retirement (rWR, l )  to one 
without it (rWR, o) , and to no social security at all (0 ,0 ). After one 
period, the endogenously determined mass of early retirees jumps to its 
steady state level, and the conditions for (rWR, l )  to be a SIE outcome 
are sufficient to guarantee that ( r ™ ,  l )  will be sustained in the game 
without commitment as well.
Notice that, as shown in proposition 5.1, for some range of parame­
ters, the voting game with commitment displays multiple equilibria, and 
two SIE outcomes, (rWR, l )  and (tnr,o'), may arise. In these cases, the 
initial condition of the economy, e, could be used to rule out (rWR, l )  
as a SSPSIE outcome of the game, according to condition (i) in proposi­
tion 5.2. This situation has an interesting interpretation. Consider two 
economies that have the same structure, i.e. same ability distribution 
function, population growth rate, and rate of return, but that differ in 
their initial stock of old agent with incomplete working history. Then, 
the economy with a large e could adopt the early retirement provision, 
whereas the other would implement a social security system with no early 
retirement. This example underlines the importance of the initial mass 
of elderly who exited the labor market with incomplete history in the 
introduction of the early retirement institution.
The next corollary contains the main result of the paper. It shows 
the sufficient conditions for a social security system with early retire­
ment, ( r ^ M ) ,  to be sustained a SSPSIE outcome in a game without 
commitment.
Corollary 7 If (A)
e >  min -  (1 +  n)F ( §  (tWR))  , -  (1 +  n)F (x (twr)) J ,
(B )F (xWR) > a n d ( C ) ^  < F ( x (twr)),
there exists a SSPSIE in which the outcome is a constant sequence (r, a ) =




























































































Condition (A) guarantees that, at t =  0, there exists a large enough 
initial mass of old people with incomplete working history to politically 
sustain the introduction of the early retirement provision. Condition (B) 
guarantees that enough young agents will choose to retire early, once 
early retirement has been introduced, and will therefore be willing to 
support this institution. Condition (C) is only required in the extreme 
case in which xmT <  that is, when a social security system with no
early retirement provision would not be supported. It guarantees that 
enough old and low-ability young individuals support a social security 
system (with an early retirement provision) of size t w r . These conditions 
depend on the shape of the ability distribution function. Ceteris paribus, 
a more unequal ability distribution leads to more early retirements, and 
thus makes it easier to sustain the system.
5.3 Discussion
The first two conditions in corollary 5.3 have a very appealing economic 
interpretation. The former suggests that, in order for an early retirement 
provision to be initially introduced, a large number of elderly individu­
als with incomplete working history has to be redundant. W e believe 
that this represents a fair description of the dominant scenario in many 
industrialized countries at the time of the initial adoption of the early 
retirement provisions. Since the late 60s, in fact, these countries have 
experienced a process of deindustrialization, which has provoked large 
sectoral shifts in employment (see figures 1 to 3). The timing and the 
magnitude of this process have largely differed across countries, possibly 
in response to differences in the initial mix of productions and in the 
labor market institutions (as trade unions density, existing labor market 
protections, etc.). However, in section 2 we showed that in most countries 
the adoption of early retirement occurred after an initial large reduction 
in total industrial employment, and that this decreasing trend has con­
tinued over the years. Since low ability elderly workers were among the 
most affected by the reduction in employment, these data are in line with 




























































































a pathway to accommodate the redundant, low ability, elderly workers 
out of the labor force and into retirement.
The latter condition suggests that the sustainability of the early 
retirement provision requires this institution to induce a large number 
of early retirements among the future generations. This result is related 
to the recent literature on policy persistence. As in Coate and Morris 
(1999), in our politico-economic equilibrium (with early retirement), the 
introduction of the policy, i.e., the institution of early retirement, induces 
the low ability young agents to undertake certain actions to benefit from 
the policy. These actions, notable the use of the early retirement pro­
vision, are crucial to create a new (endogenous) group of elderly with 
incomplete working history, and thus to guarantee the future sustain­
ability of the policy. The institution of early retirement creates its own 
future constituency by inducing people to retire early.
Condition (B) also suggests that the early retirement provision in­
duces a large proportion of workers -  mainly low educated ones -  to 
retire early. In fact, over the last two decades, most of the large share 
of early retirees have been low ability workers. Table 2 shows that, for 
male workers aged from 55 to 64, retirements are lower among college 
educated people, and reach the highest level among individual with less 
than primary education. This pattern is shared by several countries, with 
particularly large share of low-ability early retirees in Belgium, France 
and Italy.
5.4 Extensions
In our model, the political decisions over the social security system are 
divided into two jurisdictions, (a, r ), and the third variable which defines 
a social security system, the full pension, p, is residually determined to 
balance the budget constraint. We refer to this political system as a 
r-legislature. Clearly, we could have analyzed a p-legislature, in which a  
and p were directly determined through the political process, and r  was 
residually obtained through the budget constraint. This modeling choice 




























































































an early retirement provision affects all individuals through a reduction 
in the full pension; whereas in a p-legislature, the cost of introducing this 
institution is entirely beard by the workers, through an increase in the tax 
rate. As a result, in a p-legislature, the old with complete working history 
are unaffected by the institution of early retirement; moreover, the cost 
of the early retirement provision is contemporaneous to its introduction, 
as the young are immediately required to pay higher taxes.
W e choose to concentrate on a r-legislature in order to have a model 
in which the results would not heavily rely on the existence of an indif­
ference relation over a relevant set of alternatives for a large set of voters, 
i.e., the old age retirees’ decisions over the early retirement institution. 
Additionally, a r-legislature is able to account for the political relevance 
of an initial mass of elderly individuals in the introduction of the early 
retirement provision, which we identified as a crucial component of the 
establishment of this institution.
6 Conclusions
Generous early retirement provisions exacerbate the financial distress of 
current unfunded social security systems by increasing the dependency 
ratio. In fact, by inducing early exits from the labor market, these pro­
visions reduce the number of workers, and thus of contributors to the 
social security system, while increasing the number of retirees, and thus 
of recipients from the system.
In a simple model which reproduces these characteristics, we ana­
lyzed the political determinants which may lead to the adoption of early 
retirement. The main message of this paper is that the initial introduc­
tion and the long run sustainability of early retirement provisions requires 
a large initial shock and some degree of policy persistence. Specifically, 
the initial adoption of this institution relies heavily on the existence of 
an initial stock of elderly people who exited the labor market with an 
incomplete working history, and who, therefore, axe not entitled to an old 




























































































The long run political sustainability of this institution is based on the 
existence of a large number of (low-ability) workers, who, after the early 
retirement institution has been introduced, and thanks to the incentives 
it produces, decide to benefit from this provision, and retire early.
W e relate the existence of an initial mass of elderly workers with 
incomplete working history to the initial stages of the deindustrializa­
tion process. In eight of the eleven countries analyzed by Gruber and 
Wise (1999), early retirement provisions were adopted immediately af­
ter the first severe reduction in industrial employment since 1960. This 
large drop in employment was mainly born by unexperienced young and 
low-ability elderly workers. Did early retirement represent a measure to 
reduce unemployment among the young, through a direct substitution 
of elderly workers with young unemployed? We believe not, since the 
large increase in youth unemployment came only later, in the mid70s; 
although we think that later modifications of the provisions may have 
been intended to serve this purpose.
In our view, early retirement provisions, often by mean of disability 
schemes, were meant to provide financial support to those middle aged, 
low ability workers who became redundant before having matured the 
right to an old age pension.
An complementary argument can be found in Caballero and Ham- 
mour (1998 and 1999). They argue that after the vigorous growth of the 
1950s and 1960s, which fueled increasing profits rates, in the late sixties 
Europe experienced a period of tensions and strikes. This was due to the 
action of the labor movements, which tried to increase the share of the 
production appropriated by the labor factor. In this context, early retire­
ment provisions may be seen as one of the instruments of redistribution 
from capital to labor.
We believe that the relevance of the institutional push in favor of 
the labor factor has to be combined with the existence of redundant el­
derly workers to explain the adoption of early retirement. In our view, the 
institutional push identified by Caballero and Hammour (1998 and 1999) 
helped to build up the political momentum for the introduction of early 




























































































had contributed to made enough low-ability elderly workers redundant. 
This institutional differences may help to explain why most European 
countries immediately responded to reductions in industrial employment 
by instituting early retirement, whereas in the US and Canada, the adop­
tion of a generous provision came only after the oil shocks.
Our model suggests that the long run political sustainability of the 
early retirement provision is due to its persistence. By creating strong 
incentives for the current low-ability young workers to retire early in 
the future, early retirement creates its own future political constituency. 
Does this imply that we will never get rid of this provision? W e believe 
not. In a companion paper (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2000)), we show 
that as the population becomes older, and the dependency ratio exceeds 
a certain threshold, early retirement will eventually lose its political sus­
tainability and be abandoned.
Finally, our model contradicts a well established result, based on 
unidimensional voting models (see Meltzer and Richard (1981)), that 
more unequal societies adopt larger redistributive systems. In our bidi- 
mensional voting model, this implication may break down. A  more un­
equal economy with a large initial mass of elderly with incomplete work­
ing history may introduce early retirement and have a lower tax rate 
than a less unequal economy, which has less initial elderly with incom­




























































































Table 1: Early Retirement
France
Year of Adoption
1963,1972 -  78(U B ,YE ), 1983
Netherlands 1967(DT), 1976(UB,FP)
Italy 1969 ,197?(DT)
Germany 1969(DT), 1972(UB), 1984(YE)
Sweden 1970(DT), 1971(FP), 1976




US 1961 (AF), 1977 ,70s(FP)
Canada 1984(only in Quebec), 1987
Programs Characteristics: A F =  actuarially fair; Y E  =  pension 
to an elder worker in exchange for the employment of a young worker; 
D T =  Disability Transfers awarded to elderly workers according to labor 
market conditions; UB =  Unemployment Benefits as a bridge program 
toward old age pensions; Firms’ Pension Plans (FP).
Sources: Gruber and Wise (1999), OECD Employment Outlook
1992.





























































































Share of Retirees among Male Workers aged 55-64 by Level of 
Education in 1995
No further Vocational Third Level
Education Education Education
Belgium 53.4% 57.6% 36.9%
France 51.1% 47.6% 28.9%
Italy 44.7% 47.4% 22.2%
Netherlands 56.8% 48.2% 40.8%
UK 24.1% 20.6% 21.4%
Germany 29.2% 28.5% 21.6%
Spain 24.9% 26.9% 21.6%





























































































A .l  Structure Induced Equilibrium: Definitions
The Political System: Our political system describes a decision-making 
institution which has 1 +  1/(1 +  n) members, which form the electorate, 
E. The space of alternatives is a compact subset of 3R2: (r, a) s.t. r  <  1 
and a 6 { 0 ,1 } .  Institutional arrangements differ along three dimensions: 
(a) committee structure; (b) jurisdiction structure; and (c) amendment 
structure. The first two structures follow from the definitions below.
Definition 4 (Committee) The family of sets C =  { C j }  is a com­
mittee system if it covers the entire electorate E. Then the committee 
C =  { £ }  is the Committee of the Whole.
Definition 5 (Jurisdiction) Let B =  {6i ,62} be the orthogonal basis 
for R2 where bi is the unit vector for the i-th dimension. The family 
of set J =  { Jk) is a jurisdictional arrangement if it covers B. Then 
J =  {{t>i} , { 62} }  is a Simple Jurisdiction.
Additionally, call /  the function which associate a jurisdiction with 
a committee, /  : C —» J*,. In our system f  : E —* { { 61} , { 62} } ,  that is 
r 1 (M  =  r 1 (62) =  E.
To define an amendment structure we need to introduce the notions 
of status quo, x°, and of proposal. A status quo, x°, represents the 
previous agreed level on both dimensions of the issue space. For example, 
at time t, { x i ,x 2}  =
Definition 6 (Proposal) A proposal, x, is a change in x° restricted to 
a single jurisdiction. The set of proposal available to the committee of 
the whole is




























































































Definition 7 (Amendment Control Rule) For any proposal x €  g (E) ,the 
set M  (x) C SR2 consists of the modifications E may make in x. M  (x) is 
said to be an amendment control rule. An amendment control rule is a 
Germaneness rule if M  (x) =  {x ' | x' =  x° if Xi =  x °} .
Definition 8 (Vulnerability) In our political system, the status quo, 
x°, is vulnerable if there exists a proposal, x, and an amendment, x', 
such that x €  g (E ) D C (x, x°) and x' €  C (x', x) ft C (x', x °).
Where C (x, y) is the collective choice function, which in our polit­
ical system is represented by the majoritarian voting.
Definition 9 (Structure Induced Equilibrium) The status quo, x°, 




























































































A .2 Technical Appendix
A .2.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Since the function (fa) =  Tj+1 (fa) is discrete, individuals will either 
retire at the minimum retirement age, fa — 0 , or at mandatory age, 
fa =  1. For a type x young, the utility level from working during the 
entire working period, fa (x) =  1, is equal to (1 -  t() x 4- whereas 
the utility from retiring at the minimum retirement age, fa (x) =  0 , is: 
0  (1 — T() x +  v +  (1 — 0 )  atpt + °“+1lP‘+1. Since pt and pt+1 are lump sum, 
it is easy to see that, for given parameters of the social security system, 
(rt,at,pt, a !+1,p t+i), the ability level which make an agent indifferent 
between retire at mandatory age or earlier is:
R _ ( I - © )  “ tPt “  ^ ^ P t + i  +  v
Xt (1 — Tt) (1 — 0 )
Thus, young agents with ability type x < x R will retire early, at fa (x) =  
0 , whereas agents with ability type x > xR will work for the entire 
working period21, fa (x) =  1, which proves the lemma. ■
A .2.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Suppose that e /  F (xRSj , r( =  r  Vt and at =  a Vt
1.- (—») For a =  1, notice that by eq. 5 x fi =  xR(pt), and pt =  
g (xR (pt)) Vt where g (xR (p ,)) =  ^ ~ ( ~^  by 
eq. 8. Let define p' s.t. xR = x. Notice that g (xR (0)) =  
(1 +  n) pxf  >  0 and g (xR (p)j is decreasing and continuous on 
the interval p €  [0,p'] (because °I X̂0̂  =  dx̂  <  0, in
fact <  0 and >  0). Moreover, g (xR (p)j is con­
stant for p > p', g (xR (p)j =  • Thus, the expression
21We assume that individuals who are indifferent between early retirement and 




























































































p = g (xR (p) j  has an unique fixed point for Vt, which proves suffi­
ciency.
2.- •(<—) If pt — p Vt then, because rt =  r  Vt and a t =  a  Vt, by eq. 5 
xR — xR Vt. Using eq. 8, we have that
[l -  (1 -  6 ) Lf ( F  (x fl) ) ]  (1 +  n) px _
Po =  l - ( l - a ) e  +  ( l  +  n ) ( l - © ) F ( x * ) T 
[ l - ( l - 6 ) L F ( F ( x fi) ) ] ( l  +  n )p I 
Pl ~  1 — (1 — a) F  (xR) +  (1 +  n) (1 — © ) F (xr )T
then, since by assumption e ^  F  {xR̂ , po =  Pi implies a — 1, 
which completes the proof.
A .2 .3  L em m a  A . 7
To establish the following lemma, we need to introduce some notation. 
Let Ry (x, a ) be the weak preference relation over r  G [0,1], given a, for 
a type x young agent, Pv (x, ct) be the strict preference relation over r  G 
[0, 1], given a, for a type x young agent, and Iy (x, a) be the indifference 
relation over r  G [0,1], given a , for a type x young agent.
L em m a 8 At steady state and with commitment, for a given a, if T\ >  t2 




T\ Iy (x,a) r2 — *
T\Py (x ,a )  t2 — ♦ 
r2P w ( x , a) 7*1 — *
| T2Ry (x', a) 7*i 
\  T\Ry (x/, q) t2
r iF y (x ',a ) r 2 for
r2F v (x ', a ) Tj for
for all x' >  x 
for all x' <  x
all x' <  x.
all x' >  x.
Proof.
Remember that a  G {0 ,1 } .  If a  =  0, then nobody will retire early, 




























































































In the case of a  =  1, let us define 





. Let us begin with
(A)
( t2Rv (x ', 1) T\ for all x' >  x
\ T\Ft? (x ', 1) r2 for all x' <  x
Consider the following three cases:
i) <t>{x,Ti) =  </>(x,r2) =  1.
In this case, since we have T\Iy (x, l ) r 2, then using the indirect 
utility function, we have that
(t2 -  7i) x  +  — j—  (pi -  p2) =  0 (27)
which implies pi >  p2. By Lemma 3.1 we know that no individual 
with ability level x ' >  x will retire early for T\ or r2, (i.e. <p(x\ rj) =  
4>{x', r2) =  1), and clearly t2Rv (x ', 1) T\.
For x' <  x  and again using Lemma 3.1 there are three cases: (a) 
0 (x', ri) =  0 (x/ , r2) =  1, then clearly (r2 — rj) x '+  >  0 which
implies T\Ry (x', 1) r2. (b) 0 (x ', Ti) =  <t>j(x', r2) =  0 ,  then by eq. 27,
0  (t2 -  n )  x' +  (̂1 -  0 ) +  y ^ ; )  (pj -  p2) >  0
which implies r1i?!/ (x', l ) r 2, since now x' pays less taxes and re­
ceives a larger transfers over the life time than x. (c) <fi(x', n )  =  0  
and </>(x', r2) =  1, in section (a) we showed that if the individual 
with ability x' < x does not retire early, then TiRy (x ', 1) r2; clearly, 
if she now prefers to retire early for r  =  Ti it will be because her 
utility is larger, thus her order of preferences will be T\Ry (x', 1) r2. 
We showed that rxRy (x', 1) r2 for all x' <  x.


































































































in) <p(x,Ti) =  0  and 0 (x ,t2) =  1.
Using the indirect utility function, we have that
(0(1 -T i) -  (1 - t2))x+
( Ti _  +  (1  *- e ) ) P l + „ _ ( I l _ ) K  = 0 (28)
By definition of indifference, if a type x were to work all her working 
life for n  {<p(x, Ti) =  1), she would be worst off with T\ than with 
r2, that is:
(r2 - r 1)x +  ^ ^ < 0  (29)
1 +  r
Analogously, if she were to retire early for r2, (<fi(x, r2) =  0), she 
would be worst off with r2 than with rj, that is
© ((t2 -  ri)) x +  ( +  (1 -  ©)) (pi -  p2) >  0 (30)
By Lemma 3.1, for x' >  x we have two cases: (a) </>(x',Ti) =
0  and <p(x', r2) =  1, in which case we clearly have r2Ry (x1, 1) Ti,
by eq. 28; (b) <p(x', rx) =  1 and (f>(x', r2) =  1, in which case by 
inequality 29, r2i?v (x7, 1) Tj. Again, by Lemma 3.1 for x' < x we 
have two cases: (a) <t>{x\ Tj) =  0  and </>(x',r2) =  1, and thus by 
eq. 28 T\Ry (x', 1) r2; and (b) 0(x',ri) =  0(x', r2) =  0 , which, by 
inequality 30 implies T\Ry (x', 1) r2. Notice that the left hand sides 
of equations 28, 29, and 30 are all decreasing in x.
(B) T\Py (x, 1) t2 — ♦ TiPy (x', 1) r2 for all x' < x.
Consider three cases:
i) <f>(x,Ti) =  0(x , t2) =  1.
By definition of strict preferences we have:
(t2 -  Ti) x +  (pi -  pi) >  0. (31)
1 +  r
By Lemma 3.1, for x' < x, we have three cases: (a) for 0(x',rj) =




























































































(b) for 4>(x', Ti) =  <j)(x', r2) =  0, since the type x' young pays less 
taxes and receives more life time transferences than a type x, we 
have
(r2 -  n) x' +  ( y ^ :  +  ( !  -  © ) )  (Pi -  Pa) >  0 (32)
and thus riPv (x1, 1) r2; ( c)  <p(x’,Ti) =  0  and <p(x'.72) =  1, in (a) 
we showed that if a type x' does not retire early for T\, she strictly 
prefers Ti to r2; if she now retire early for Ti it is because her utility 
is larger, and thus she still prefers Ti to t2, i.e., t xPy (x1, 1) r2.
ii) 4>{x, tx) =  4>{x,t2) =  0.
By definition of strict preference, we have
0  (r2 -  n )  x +  ( ^ 7  +  ( !  -  0 ) )  (Pi ~  P2) >  0. (33)
By Lemma 3.1, a type x' < x young will also retire early for rx and 
t2, and thus txP v (x1, 1) r2.
Hi) <p(x,Ti) =  0  and <p(x,r2) =  1.
By definition of strict preference, we have
(0(i  - n )  -  (1 - T 2))x+ ( y ^ :  +  C1 ~ © ) )p i+ w-P 2 > 0 (34)
By Lemma 3.1, for x' < x, there are two cases: (a) 4>(x',tx) =  0  
and <t>{x',T2) =  1, in which case by the inequality 34, we have 
that (x1, 1)7i; (b) <p(x',Ti) =  0(x',r2) =  0. Notice that 
since txPv (x, 1)t2, then there will exist an £ > 0 ,  such that, 
(n,pi — £) Iv (x, 1) (r2,p2), that is eq. 34 can be transformed into 
the following expression:
(0  (1 -  Ti) -  (1 -  r2) ) x +  +  (1 -  © )) (pi -  0  + v  - p 2 =  0
(35)
Then, if a type x agent would retire early for r2, 4>(x, r2) =  © (which 
provides less utility than mandatory age retirement), we have
0  (r2 - tx) x +  +  (1 ~ ©)) ((Pi -  0  -  P2) > 0 (36)




























































































(C) r2P y (x, 1) Ti — » t2Pv (x\ 1) 7i for all x' > x. The proof is analo­
gous to the proof of case (B). ■
A .2.4 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. Using Lemma A .7, it is easy to see that of xmT displays a strict 
preference between two tax rates, then a majority of the electorate will 
have the same preference. Notice that old individual will always prefer 
the tax rate which maximizes their pension. ■
A .2.5 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. At steady state there is a fraction F  €  [0,1] of the old 
population with incomplete working history who supports the institution 
of the early retirement. Then, the support of an additional mass of 
2̂ +  n — 2F  ( z fl) )  /2  individuals from the young generation is needed 
to obtain a =  1 by majority rule.
A  type x young individual, for a given tax rate, r , we vote for 
a =  1, if and only if
or she will vote for a  =  0. Therefore, agents with ability types
will prefer a =  1. Then, the ability type individual such that 
(1 -I- n) F  (Xma) =  ( 2  +  n — 2F /2 ,  will be the median voter on 
the jurisdiction a  for a given r  at steady state. ■
A .2.6 Proof of proposition 5.1
By Shepsle (1979) Thm 4.1, a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
SIE to exist is that the two (median) reaction functions at equations 21 
and 24 cross.
■x (1 -  t) (1 -  © ) +  p (r, 1) +  (1 -  © )) ^  +  u > 0  (37) 




























































































Consider the SIE (rNR =  l ,o ) .  For a =  0, rNR is the median’s 
ideal by definition of t n r  (see eq. 16), and it is equal to 1. For r  =  rNR =  
1, the median Xma prefers a =  0 to a =  1 if xma > x . Using the 
definition at eq. 23, and after some simple algebra, this condition can be 
written as v < v*, which proves the first part of (i).
Consider now the SIE (rWR, l ) .  First notice that twr >  tr ,
where twr Gargmax vWR (r, 1, xmT) and t r  Gargmax vNR (r, 1, xmT), 
re[0,l| re[0,l]
because if xmT retires early, she will prefer a (weakly) higher tax rate. 
For a =  1, the median voter xmT votes for t w r  (rather than for tr) if 
vWR ( t w r , l ,x mT) >  vNR (tr , 1, xmT). For r  =  tw r , the median over a, 
Xma, votes f e  Q =  1 if Xma <  X (t^ ^ )  , that is, if VWR (tWR, 1 ,Xma) >  
vnr r̂WRt o, xmaj ■ Notice that, since xma > xmT, then by lemma A .7 
this last condition implies that vWR (rWR, 1 ,x mT) >  vNR ( jWRt 0, xmr^ . 
Moreover, vNR ( r NR, 0, xmT) >  vNR (twr, 0, xmT) , because t n r  =  1 =
argmax vNR (r, 0, xmT), and vNR ( t w r , 0, xmT) >  vNR ( t r , 0, xmT) he­
reto,i) v /  v /
cause t n r  =  1 >  t w r  >  t r . Finally, vNR ( r fl,0 ,x mT  ̂ >  vNR [rR, l ,x mT) ,
since we are comparing indirect utilities for the case in which xmT does
not retire early. Thus, xma <  x (rWR̂j implies vWR [rWR, 1, xmrj >
vNR ( t r , 1, Xmr̂ ), i.e. Xmr votes for t w r , which completes the proof of 
part (i).
Part (ii): Xmr €  (±±2/1*, x].
Consider the SIE [rNR =  0 ,0 ) . The proof is analogous to part (i) 
for the SIE (tnr =  1,0^, except that now for r  =  rNR =  0, the median 
voter over a , Xma, always prefers a =  0 to a =  1.
Consider the SIE (rWR, l ) .  For a =  1, the median voter xmT votes 
for t w r  if xmr <  x  (twrS) , i.e., if xmr <  vWR (rWR, l , x mT) .  For r  =  
t w r , the median voter over a, xmQ, votes for a =  1 if xma <  x  ( r ^ ^ ) , 
which completes the proof.




























































































A .2.7 Proof of proposition 5.2
By definition of SSPSIE, we only need to show that a voting strategy 
profile, whose associated equilibrium outcome is a Structure Induced 
Equilibrium of the game with commitment, is a subgame perfect equilib­
rium.
Part A : SIE with outcome (rWR, l ) .  There are three cases 
to analyze: (i) xmT G [2 , 7̂ 7Mi], and x (r WR} < x (tw'r ) ;  (ii) xmT G 
and * { tWR) >  x (twr) i and (iii) xmT G For
simplicity we drop the argument in x and x.
Case (i): xmT G [2 , . and x < x (or equivalently x ^  €
[2,TT7Mx])
Let define the following sets of realization of the history of the game: 
H°'° =  {ht G Ht| (r, =  0 ,Q a =  0) s =  0, ...,t -  1}
and
HTt'1 =  { / i t 6  Ht\ 3t0 €  { 0 ,1 , . .. ,t  — 1} : (r, =  0 ,a , =  0 )Vs <  t0>
(rs =  twr, a, =  l )  Vs >  t0}
notice that H°'° fl Hf’1 — 0.
Consider the following voting strategy profile:




if ht 6 H(’° U HI'1 
if ht G Ht/{H °'° \J
b) for x €  (x, x)
j  (r»,0) if ht G H?’° U Hi'1 
\ (0,0) if ht G Ht/  {H?'° U HTt'x]




























































































c) V i, if the agent has a complete working history, (pt-i =  1,
s°* =  (t° ( 0 ) ,0 )  Vht e H t
d) V i, if the agent has a incomplete working history, 4>t-\ =  © ,
In this simple model the steady state is reached in one period. It 
is thus easy to see that a sufficient condition for this strategy to support 
('tw r , l )  as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is that the median 
voter over a  is less than i  at t — 0 and at steady state: xma0 < x and 
ima <  x. Since (rWR, l )  is the outcome of a SIE, by proposition 5.1, and 
by definition of case i), xma < x < x .  At t =  0, by Lemma 4.2 i mai0 <  i  
if and only if e >  ^  — (1 +  n)F ( i )  =  e* ( i ) .
Case (ii): xmT 6  [x, y ^ P i ] , and i  >  i  (or equivalently xma e
Let define the following sets of realization of the history of the game:
« k  =  (T»(l),0) V/it 6 H t.
H° =  {ht € Ht\t, =  0, s =  0 , ...,t — 1}
and
HI =  |/it G Ht\3 t0 S {0 ,1 , ...,t -  1} : T, =  0 Vs <  t0, rs =  rWR Vs >  t0} , 
notice that H^_x fl Hf_x =  0.t -i  — **•T
Consider the following voting strategy profile
a) for i  €  [i, i]
\ (r WR, l )  if 
1 (0 ,1) if
ht € H°t U H Tt 
ht e  H t/ { H °  U HJ}
b) for i  €  ( i,  i ]
(0 ,1) if ht € H?  U H Tt 




























































































c) for x G (x , x]
syt>x =  (0 ,0) V/it G / / t
For the old individuals, the strategy is identical to case (i).
A  sufficient condition for this strategy to support (rWR, l j  as a 
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is that the median voter over a is 
less than x , at t =  0 and at steady state: xmQio <  x and xma <  x. Since 
('tw r , 1 j is the outcome of a SIE, by proposition 5.1, xma <  x. At t =  0, 
by Lemma 4.2 x ^ o  <  x if and only if e >  — (1 +  n)F (x) =  e* (x).
Case (iii): xmT G ( ^ p x,x]
First notice that, using the definitions of x (r) and x (r) at equations 
23 and 25, we obtain that Vr >  0:
x (r) >  x (r) if x (r) >
1 -r r
x (r) <  x (r) if x (r) <
By proposition 5.1, (rWR, l )  is the outcome of a SIE if and only if 
^ma <  x ('tw r) and xmT <  x ( r ^ j .  Since xmT <  xmQ, then x (rWR̂  > 
Xma >  xmT >  i^ M x  implies that x (t w,r) >  x {j’WR\
Consider the same voting strategy profile as in case (ii). A  sufficient 
condition for this strategy to support (rWR, l j  as a subgame perfect 
equilibrium outcome is that: (a) the median voter over a is less than 
x at t =  0 and at steady state: xmQio <  x and Xma <  x; and (b) 
the median voter over r  is less than x at t =  0 and at steady state: 
Xmr.o <  x (twr) and xmT <  x (twr  ̂. Conditions (a) are the same as in 
the case ii), whereas conditions (b) are satisfied by proposition 5.1. In 
fact, since (rWR, l j  is a SIE, at steady state xmT <  x (j'WR') ■ Moreover, 
by Lemma 4.1, the median voter over r , xmT, does not depend on the 
initial condition, and thus xmT =  xmT,o ^  x (rWR̂ j.
Finally, notice that for x <  x, e* (x) >  e* (x), and for x >  x, e* (x) <  
e* (x). Therefore, conditions for the strategy profiles at part (i), (ii), and




























































































commitment, with associated outcome (rWR, l ) , can be summarized as 
follows:
e >  min j ^ 2 — (1 +  n ) F ( x ) , ^  — (1 +  n)F (x ) } , which proves 
the part (i) of the proposition.
Part B: SIE with outcome (r NR, 0)
Consider the following voting strategy profile:
whereas the strategy for the old individuals is identical to Part A. The 
proof is trivial, since in every period the median voter in the dimension
r, has the same ability: xmT, and rNR =arg max vNR (r, 0, x mT). ■
’■e[o,i]
A .2.8 Proof of corollary 5.3
Notice that condition (B) implies that x ^  < x (rWR ĵ, and condition 
(C) implies that xmT < x (rWR̂ . Thus, by proposition 5.1, conditions 
(B) and (C) imply that (rWR, l )  is a SIE of the voting game with com­
mitment. By proposition 5.2, condition (A) guarantees that [rWR, l )  is 
also a SSPSIE of the voting game without commitment. ■
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